Key Takeaways

• A Harris administration would likely sustain Biden’s multilateral, alliance-centered foreign policy approach.
• A Trump victory could lead to a more transactional, “America First” approach, setting new terms in dealings with US allies.
• Russia-Ukraine: Harris would maintain strong military support for Ukraine, while Trump might seek a quick ceasefire that could allow Russia to retain occupied territories, conflicting with Ukraine’s goals.
• NATO: Harris is expected to reinforce US commitments to NATO, while Trump may push for greater European defence spending and a more conditional approach to alliances.
• China: Harris would likely manage US-China relations through diplomatic collaboration with allies, whereas Trump would adopt a confrontational stance, intensifying tariffs and sanctions.
• Middle East: A Harris administration would continue a multilateral approach to alliances in the region, while a Trump presidency would likely adopt a more transactional and unilateral policy, focusing on securing specific US interests, particularly regarding Iran.

Russia-Ukraine

Harris has indicated that she will sustain US military assistance for Ukraine in keeping with President Joe Biden’s high level of support for the embattled country. Harris has condemned Russia’s invasion and pledged to support Ukraine for ‘as long as it takes’. She is also in favour of making Russia pay damages to Ukraine when the war is over.

Trump’s position on the Ukraine War is more ambiguous. The former president’s rhetoric suggests that he seeks to position himself as a dealmaker, having repeatedly said that he would end the war in a single day. A Trump Administration would likely try to instigate a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia, although Trump himself has never been clear on what the terms of a diplomatic solution would be.

However, some senior Trump team members have been more forthcoming. For example, in September, Trump’s pick for vice president, JD Vance, outlined a potential peace plan on The Shawn Ryan Show podcast. ‘What it probably looks like is the current line of demarcation between Russia and Ukraine, that becomes like a demilitarized zone,’ said Vance.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is unlikely to approve of this plan. Ukraine’s government has repeatedly stressed that the war should only end with the return to the country’s 1991 borders. However, Vance’s suggestion would allow Russia to retain the territory it occupied in Ukraine since 2014, including vital strategic areas like Crimea.

In sum, Harris is expected to maintain robust US support for Ukraine, aligning with Biden’s commitment and condemning Russia’s invasion, while also favouring reparations from Russia after the war. In contrast, Trump’s approach is more ambiguous; he has suggested he would end the conflict swiftly through a negotiated settlement. His team has hinted at a potential ceasefire plan, proposing a demilitarised zone along current frontlines, allowing Russia to retain areas seized since 2014. This stance diverges from Ukraine’s insistence on fully reclaiming its 1991 borders.

NATO and European Defence

Harris has reiterated her support for NATO and would very likely continue the incumbent Biden-Harris Administration’s commitment to multilateral security and defence arrangements. At the Munich Security Conference in 2024, Harris stressed the importance of Washington’s continued participation in NATO, calling it the ‘greatest military alliance the world has ever known.’

Trump has frequently opined that the US takes on an unfairly large burden for European defence and that other NATO partners are not spending enough. Trump has implied that the US would not defend allies that failed to spend 2% of their GDP on defence, casting doubt on the future feasibility of NATO’s Article 5 as a deterrent against attack.

It is very unlikely that Trump will pull the US out of NATO. In late October, JD Vance commented that ‘Donald Trump wants NATO to be strong,’ and that he would not exit the alliance. Even if Trump did want the US to leave NATO, he would face strong opposition from the wider American political establishment, making such a move difficult.

Trump’s impact on NATO is mixed. During his presidency, his rhetoric caused alarm and uncertainty in Europe, which is again resurfacing with the prospect of a second Trump term. On the other hand, European defence spending saw its biggest recent increases during Trump’s first term. If Trump returns to the Whitehouse, he will likely again push the Europeans to take greater responsibility for their own defence. This is an achievable objective given the impetus the Ukraine conflict has given to European defence spending, but it is uncertain whether Trump would be able to shift military assets away from Europe as some officials have suggested he would like to.

Harris strongly supports NATO as a crucial multilateral defence alliance, aligning with Biden’s approach and emphasizing US commitment to collective security. Conversely, Trump has voiced concerns about the financial burden the US bears within NATO and may push allies to increase their defence spending if re-elected, though he is unlikely to withdraw the US from the alliance. Trump’s stance could heighten European responsibility for regional security, a shift partly motivated by increased defence spending due to the Ukraine conflict, while maintaining NATO’s overall structure.

China

China is one of the few issues on which there has been cross-party consensus in Washington. Whatever the result on 5 November, it is almost certain that a Harris or Trump administration would view great power competition with China as the most significant challenge facing US foreign policy.

Harris has said little to indicate that she would significantly alter Biden’s approach to China, so a high degree of continuity between the current administration and a potential Harris presidency should be expected. Competition with China will persist and possibly intensify in several key areas, such as trade, technology, and international governance. In September, Harris commented that the US should lead ‘the world in the industries of the future, making sure America, not China, wins the competition for the twenty-first century.’ Such thinking aligns with Washington’s political consensus that the US is in strategic competition with China.

Harris’ strategy towards China is likely to mirror Biden’s insofar that the US would focus on ‘managing’ competition with China whilst avoiding wholesale conflict. In November last year, Biden met with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping, and the pair agreed on several economic and security deliverables to limit escalation. Harris has indicated she has similar policy preferences to Biden. During her meeting with Xi in 2022, she told the Chinese president that the two countries must maintain ‘open lines of communication to responsibly manage the competition between our countries’.

A Harris administration approach to strategic competition with China will likely depend heavily on US alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. During diplomatic trips to the region as vice president, Harris sought to reassure allies like Japan and Taiwan that the US will support them in the face of ‘disturbing behaviour in the East China Sea and in the South China Sea’. It is likely that as president, Harris would continue to emphasise the importance of ‘international rules and norms’, and where possible, act in concert with allies in multilateral settings to push back against Chinese influence.

Trump shares many of the same concerns regarding China as Harris, but his approach to Sino-American strategic competition would likely be more confrontational. During Trump’s presidency, his China policy aimed to curb China’s advancement and push its leaders to address American priorities and concerns over its actions. In 2019, Trump imposed wide-ranging tariffs on Chinese goods, resulting in a trade war.

A second Trump term would very likely result in the imposition of further sanctions on China and an intensification of the trade war. Trump has said that he will ‘completely eliminate dependence on China in all critical areas,’ over the course of a four-year plan to ‘phase out all Chinese imports of essential goods’. He would also increase tariffs, possibly up to 60% and revoke China’s ‘Most Favored Nation’ trade status which the US granted China in 2001 when it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO).

In conclusion, both a Harris and a Trump administration would likely continue prioritising great power competition with China, a rare bipartisan consensus in US foreign policy. Harris’s strategy would probably follow Biden’s approach, focusing on managing the rivalry through diplomatic channels, strengthening alliances, and cooperating on select issues where possible. Trump, by contrast, would likely pursue a more aggressive stance, further escalating economic pressures and pushing policies aimed at limiting reliance on China. Though their methods would differ, both leaders would see the US-China competition as central to advancing American interests.

The Middle East

Trump and Harris showcase contrasting potential foreign policy paths in the Middle East, rooted in their differing philosophies on US power and global engagement. Trump’s prospective approach, informed by his previous term, would likely continue the ‘America First’ stance, prioritising direct actions and security alliances to maximize US influence with limited intervention. Harris, by contrast, advocates for renewed diplomacy and coalition-building, focusing on multilateral solutions that emphasize the US’s role within a broader, cooperative framework. These perspectives reveal divergent approaches to stability, alliances, and regional influence.

If re-elected, Trump would likely maintain and possibly intensify his firm stance on Iran. His initial withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and subsequent ‘maximum pressure’ campaign were intended to curb Iran’s regional influence through sanctions rather than negotiation. A second Trump administration might further enhance sanctions and explore additional alliances, reinforcing containment measures. His earlier pivot to building relations between Israel and Arab states, evidenced by the Abraham Accords, may drive further efforts toward coalition-building with Gulf allies, especially in opposition to Iran.

In contrast, Harris favours re-engagement with Iran through diplomatic channels, aiming to curb Iran’s nuclear program by possibly revisiting or modifying the JCPOA. Her approach would likely prioritise bringing allies back to the negotiation table to re-establish checks on Iran’s nuclear ambitions through collective oversight. Such a stance aligns with her broader philosophy, supporting regional stability by engaging in diplomatic solutions that involve allies and international bodies, aiming to integrate human rights and cooperative frameworks into US policy.

Trump’s re-election would likely signal a continuation of his military-light approach to conflicts in the Middle East. His previous decision to reduce the US footprint in Syria was driven by his commitment to limiting American involvement in prolonged regional conflicts. This could indicate that a future Trump administration would pursue further troop withdrawals and reduced ground commitments. Harris, however, supports sustained, if limited, engagement, emphasizing the need to retain critical alliances that help maintain regional stability, even if direct U.S. military presence is minimized.

Human rights considerations also separate the two. Trump’s past de-prioritisation of internal political reform in allied nations like Saudi Arabia might continue, with strategic alliances taking precedence over pressures for change. Harris, however, is likely to emphasise human rights within her foreign policy, advocating for diplomatic pressure on allies to uphold such values while balancing them with strategic interests. This approach would support a narrative of the US as a stabilizing force committed to upholding democratic principles.

In sum, Trump’s potential Middle East strategy reflects a more transactional approach that prioritizes US security interests and leverages strategic alliances for direct influence, with less emphasis on diplomatic nuances. Harris’s likely approach, however, underscores a return to multilateralism, prioritizing diplomacy and human rights while engaging in cooperative efforts to manage regional complexities.